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ABSTRACT
Road transport contributes to around one-ﬁfth of the EU’s total CO2 emissions and is the only major 
sector in the EU where greenhouse gas emissions are still rising. Swedish road transport causes 30% 
of all emissions. Addressing transport emissions is therefore crucial for meeting the Paris Agreement 
commitments on climate change.
The Swedish government aims to have a fossil-independent vehicle ﬂeet by 2050; moreover, an 
emissions reduction target for the road transport sector of 80% (compared to 2010) by 2030 has been 
suggested. The government-initiated investigation ‘Fossilfrihet på väg’ sets out potential pathways, but 
a knowledge gap currently remains in regard to which path would be the most beneﬁcial or least bur-
densome in terms of macroeconomic effects while still decarbonising the road transport sector.
This paper contributes to ﬁll that knowledge gap by applying a vehicle stock modelling framework 
and a demand-driven global econometric model (E3ME) and by evaluating different technology path-
ways for Sweden to meet the 2030 and 2050 government targets. The stock model has been adjusted to 
be consistent with ‘Fossilfrihet på väg’ and uses technology deployment and cost estimates to model 
the Swedish vehicle stock emissions in three technology-driven scenarios.
The analysis shows that decarbonisation of transport can have positive impacts upon the Swed-
ish economy, primarily through the replacement of imported fossil fuels with domestically produced 
electricity and biomass, while a further stimulus is provided by the construction of infrastructure to 
support electric vehicle recharging and fuel cell refuelling. Through quick action to encourage the 
deployment of new technologies and powertrains into the vehicle stock, plus policies aimed at promot-
ing the domestic production of sustainable biomass, Sweden can maximise the potential gains from the 
decarbonisation process.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Sweden is one of the signatory countries to the Paris Agreement, aimed at keeping the global 
temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. Road trans-
port contributes around one-ﬁfth to the EU’s total emissions of CO2, and is the only major 
sector in the EU where greenhouse gas emissions are still rising. Addressing transport emis-
sions is therefore an important part of meeting the Paris Agreement commitments on Climate 
Change. Since 1970s Sweden has undergone a process of decarbonisation of the economy 
through the installation of district heating, waste incineration plants for heat and electricity 
production and nuclear hydropower [1]; as these ‘low hanging fruit’ measures are increas-
ingly taken up, future carbon emission reductions as required under Sweden’s Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement will become increasingly 
dependent upon the ability to decarbonise the hitherto relatively ‘untouched’ road transport 
sector.
Currently, road transport is responsible for 80% of Sweden’s annual oil consumption, com-
pared to a global average of around 50% [2]. The Swedish government aims to have a fossil 
fuel-independent vehicle ﬂeet by 2050 and a target of a 70% reduction in emissions in 2030 
(compared to 2010) has been recommended [3]. It has been suggested that the 70% reduction 
in emissions from the transport sector as a whole could be met through an 80% reduction in 
252 A. C. Mellquist, et al., Int. J. of Energy Prod. & Mgmt., Vol. 2, No. 3 (2017) 
the road transport sector and smaller reductions in the maritime and aviation sectors [3]. The 
governmental-initiated investigation ‘Fossilfrihet på väg’ [4] sets out potential pathways for 
this but does not compare their macroeconomic effects for Sweden. A number of studies have 
been carried out to assess the macroeconomic impact of decarbonising passenger cars, both 
at a European and Member State level [5–7]. Very few macroeconomic impact studies of CO2 
emissions reductions have been undertaken for Sweden [1] and none has focused on the 
Swedish road transport sector. There is therefore limited knowledge as to which path to 
decarbonising the road transport sector would be the most beneﬁcial or least burdensome for 
Sweden in terms of macroeconomic effects.
This paper explores potential pathways to meeting the Swedish emissions target. We apply 
a vehicle stock modelling framework to assess the role that different deployment rates of fuel 
efﬁciency technologies and advanced powertrains can play in allowing the vehicle stock to 
meet this target, and the extent to which biofuel blending must be used to meet the shortfall 
so that all technology deployments ultimately meet the 2030 target. We then apply a macro- 
econometric simulation model (E3ME) to assess the potential economic impacts of different 
technology pathways in terms of GDP, employment, consumer expenditure and investment 
plus imports.
2 APPROACH
The decarbonisation of road transport is modelled through a Vehicle Stock Model (VSM), 
which calculates the outcomes of technology-led scenarios in terms of energy demand by 
fuel and consumer expenditure on road transport and fuels, plus investment in infrastructure. 
These are then fed into the E3ME model to provide a detailed analysis of the effects of dif-
ferent technology pathways that meet the Swedish Government’s road transport carbon 
emissions target on the Swedish economy.
E3ME is a demand-driven global macro-econometric simulation model covering 59 global 
regions with detailed sectoral disaggregation [8]. It projects forwards annually up to 2050. It 
has an integrated treatment of the economy, energy system, emissions and material demand. 
The model has been applied to assessing the macroeconomic impacts of decarbonising road 
transport in a number of studies across Europe, including Fuelling Europe’s Future [5] and 
national studies in the UK [6] and France [7].
The motor vehicle ﬂeet, with an average vehicle life span of well over 10 years, can take 
time to see changes in the characteristics of new vehicles feed through to the whole ﬂeet. To 
capture this, we use a vehicle stock model to develop a representation of the current Swedish 
vehicle ﬂeet and allow us to model scenarios for the deployment of new vehicle powertrains 
and efﬁciency improvement technologies.
The vehicle stock model works on basis of modelling annual cohorts of vehicles as they 
enter the stock (as new vehicle sales) and then model changes in characteristics (such as 
average distance driven) as they age, until they retire according to a survival rate curve, with 
a declining chance of survival as vehicles get older. This allows us to accurately model the 
propagation of new technologies in vehicles and the deployment of alternative powertrains 
and see how assumptions on deployments in sales over time translate into penetration across 
the vehicle stock.
We can then observe the overall impact on the characteristics of the vehicle stock to feed 
into the macroeconomic results in E3ME. The main results that feed into the results are fuel 
consumption by fuel type, average price of motor vehicles and investment in infrastructure to 
support alternative powertrains.
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The VSM is calibrated through the use of extended historical data, ensuring that the model 
successfully replicates historical vehicle stock estimates. Assumptions on the future deploy-
ment of fuel efﬁciency technologies and advanced powertrains are then input to develop the 
different scenarios; building upon a reference scenario which assumes that the Swedish new 
vehicle sales meet European Commission targets for carbon emissions in 2021 (of an average 
of 95 g of CO2 per kilometres) [9]. In total, three alternative scenarios have been implemented 
in the VSM and the results fed into E3ME.
E3ME is a detailed European and Global Economic, Energy and Environment (E3) model 
where relationships are estimated empirically. The structure of E3ME is based on the system 
of national accounts, as deﬁned by ESA95 [10], with further linkages to materials, energy 
and environmental emissions. The labour market is also covered in detail, with estimated sets 
of equations for labour demand, supply, wages and working hours. International trade is 
modelled at bilateral sector level. In total there are 33 sets of econometrically estimated equa-
tions, also including the components of GDP (consumption, investment, and international 
trade), prices, energy and material demands. Each equation set is disaggregated by country 
and by sector.
E3ME’s historical database covers the period 1970–2014 and the model projects forward 
annually to 2050. The main data sources are Eurostat, United Nations, OECD’s Stan data-
base, World Input-Output database (WIOD) and the IEA, supplemented by national sources. 
Gaps in the data are estimated using customised software algorithms.
Figure 1: Key steps in the modelling framework.
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The economy module provides measures of economic activity and general price levels to 
the energy module; the energy module provides measures of emissions of the main air pollut-
ants to the environment module, which in turn can give measures of damage to health and 
buildings. The energy module provides detailed price levels for energy carriers distinguished 
in the economy module and the overall price of energy as well as energy use in the 
economy.
3 SCENARIO DESIGN
The three scenarios have been designed to showcase different levels of policy intervention; 
assuming that the deployment of fuel efﬁciency technologies and advanced powertrains will 
be driven by supply-side policy, rather than manufacturers, the scenarios demonstrate the 
need for increasing policy ambition, in encouraging the deployment of ever more technology 
and larger shares of advanced powertrains, as well as increased use of biofuels. All of them 
meet the government-initiated emissions target of 80% reduction.
In each case, the technology and powertrain deployment was introduced ﬁrst, based upon 
previous scenario analysis carried out by the authors and their own views as to what is viable 
in Sweden over the time period considered; to ensure that the 2030 emissions target was met 
in all cases (except the reference), drop-in biofuels are added (the required percentage of 
biofuel required in each case was calculated by the authors through a trial-and-error 
process).
3.1 CPI
The CPI (Current Policy Initiatives) is the baseline used in this analysis. It is a single pathway 
developed by the authors to deliver implemented government policy; in the case of passenger 
cars, this means that the emissions from the average new car in 2021 are 95 g/km. For buses 
and heavy-duty vehicles, where the European Commission currently has no conﬁrmed emis-
sions targets, there is no change in average emissions levels from today (and therefore no 
deployment of fuel efﬁciency technologies or advanced powertrains).
Given the short period of time that is available to meet the 2021 emissions targets, these 
are primarily met by the deployment of several fuel efﬁciency technologies in passenger cars 
and vans, although there is a slight increase in the deployment of plug-in hybrids (PHEVs, for 
both cars and vans) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by 2021, to 2% and 1%, 
respectively.
3.2 BIO
This scenario shows no substantial change in the powertrain mix of new sales of passenger 
cars from the current state of play; internal combustion engines (ICEs) are 94.5% of all sales 
in 2030, with the remainder consisting of hybrids (HEVs, 2.5%), plug-in hybrids (PHEVs, 
2.0%) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs, 1.0%). However, the deployment of new technol-
ogy improves the fuel efﬁciency, and therefore, the emissions intensity, of these vehicles as 
compared to their current equivalents. Similar trends are observed in buses and HGVs; for 
buses and vans, ICEs are 94.5%, with the remainder HEVs, PHEVs and BEVs, while in 
HGVs are almost all ICEs (the only exception being 0.2% of sales of the smallest category of 
HGVs, which are BEVs).
Across all vehicle types, the primary policy, which reduces emissions, is the use of drop-in 
biofuels. In order to reach the 2030 carbon emissions target, 43 TWh of biofuel is required 
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(with the biofuel component reaching 70% for both petrol and diesel), around four times as 
much as it is estimated can be produced on a sustainable basis within Sweden; the remainder 
is imported, in this scenario.
3.3 ELEC
In this scenario, the technology deployment used in the BIO scenario is taken as a starting 
point, and augmented by an ambitious electriﬁcation of the vehicle ﬂeet. As such, there is a 
noticeable shift in the powertrain mix of new sales of cars, vans and (to a more limited extent) 
HGVs over the period to 2030. Cars and buses rapidly switch to sales of BEVs (which are 
70% of sales for both by 2030), as well as increased sale shares of PHEVs (30% and 10%). 
For freight vehicles, there is a distinction between vans and light HGVs, where the shift is to 
a mix of BEVs and PHEVs, medium HGVs, which see an increasing roll out of PHEVs, and 
heavy HGVs, where sales remain exclusively focussed on ICE powertrains.
To meet the remaining gap to the 2030 target, drop-in biofuels are introduced and fuel 
mixes reach 40% and 60% for petrol and diesel respectively in 2030. The 24 TWh of biofuel 
required is around twice the amount that can be sustainably produced domestically, with the 
remainder needing to be imported.
3.4 FCV
In this scenario, in addition to the technologies and powertrains deployed in the ELEC sce-
nario, additional powertrain shifts are deployed, reducing the percentage of new sales 
attributed to ICEs, PHEVs and BEVs at the expensive of a rapid expansion in the sales of fuel 
cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). Amongst passenger cars and buses, while some HEVs and 
PHEVs remain, all BEVs are replaced by FCEVs. Across HGVs, the impact is even larger; 
while in the earlier scenarios sales remained dominated by ICEs, the development of fuel cell 
infrastructure allows large proportions of the HGV ﬂeet to shift to fuel cells.
Despite this extreme technology and powertrain deployment, the carbon emissions target 
was still not reached. As a result, drop-in biofuels were again deployed at 40% for petrol and 
60% for diesel. The 22 TWh biofuels required in this scenario will also require a portion of 
imports of biofuels, as in the ELEC scenario.
4 ANALYSIS
The four scenarios all have different impacts upon the Swedish economy, as captured in the 
E3ME model. In the analysis that follows, the three alternative technology and powertrain 
deployments are compared to the CPI scenario, which forms the baseline for this analysis 
(based, as it is, upon announced policy).
The economic impacts of the decarbonisation of transport are likely to be felt in a number 
of different ways. Changes in the purchase prices of vehicles and fuels will have impact upon 
consumer spending, in terms of how much is allocated towards buying and running a vehicle, 
and how much is available for spending on other items; increased investment, required to 
provide the required charging and refuelling infrastructure, will have positive short-term eco-
nomic impacts (although within the modelling, all investment is ultimately ‘paid back’); and 
changes in fuel demand will impact upon imports of fossil (and potentially other) fuels. 
These effects are all considered individually below; note that the focus is primarily on the 
period to 2030, as it is this year in which the Swedish emissions target has to be met; how-
ever, the analysis continues out to 2050 to measure the impact of the technology deployment 
256 A. C. Mellquist, et al., Int. J. of Energy Prod. & Mgmt., Vol. 2, No. 3 (2017) 
(some of which only starts to enter the stock just before 2030) as it permeates through the 
vehicle stock.
4.1 Output
In the modelling analysis, all the scenarios show a positive economic impact in terms of GDP, 
as compared to the baseline. The largest impact in 2030 is in the ELEC scenario (0.4% higher 
than baseline in 2030), followed by FCV (0.3%) and BIO (0.1%), although by 2050 the FCV 
scenario has the largest difference from baseline, primarily as a result of the additional invest-
ment required to provide fuel cell recharging stations. The ELEC scenario has a higher 
deployment of advanced powertrains by 2030 compared to FCV, reﬂecting the fact that the 
time horizon for feasible mass deployment is further away for fuel cell vehicles.
The differential impacts are driven by three separate effects;
s  A shift in consumer expenditure patterns, driven by changes in the costs associated with 
purchasing and operating a motor vehicle;
 s An increase in investment, which is required to fund the infrastructure (for both electricity 
and hydrogen) required to refuel a ﬂeet of advanced powertrain vehicles;
s  A change in imports, resulting from a decrease in demand for imported fossil fuel, and 
their replacement with domestically produced biofuels, electricity or hydrogen.
These are explored in more detail below. The key sectoral impacts in terms of output are: an 
increase in outputs from consumer services, as a result of increased consumer expenditure in 
these sectors; a boost to manufacturing and construction, from the additional investment 
stimulus; and higher output in domestic energy production and supply from the replacement 
of imported fuels with domestic energy. In addition, the multiplier effects result in a small 
additional increase across the economy as a whole.
4.2 Employment
The positive GDP impacts outlined above also translate to increased employment in the 
Swedish economy. The percentage increase above the baseline in employment in each 
Table 1: GDP expenditure at market prices. Relative difference compared to baseline.
Scenario 2030 2050
BIO 0.1% 0.3%
ELEC 0.4% 0.7%
FCV 0.3% 0.9%
Table 2: Industry employment. Relative difference compared to baseline.
Scenario 2030 2050
BIO 0.1% 0.3%
ELEC 0.5% 0.8%
FCV 0.6% 1.0%
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scenario is larger than the increase in GDP, as the jobs being created have below-average 
productivity (for example, the largest sectoral employment increase, in absolute terms, is in 
retail, where productivity levels are relatively low).
The largest difference from baseline is in the FCV scenario (0.6% in 2030), with smaller 
positive impacts in ELEC (0.6%) and BIO (0.1%). The sectoral distribution of the increases 
is broadly similar, although percentage increases (relative to those seen in other sectors) are 
higher in consumer services, due to the relatively low productivity levels of these jobs (mean-
ing that more jobs are required to deliver the increase in output driven by increased consumer 
expenditure).
4.3 Consumer expenditure
The deployment of fuel-efﬁcient technologies, including advanced powertrains (batteries and 
fuel cells) increase the purchase price of vehicles, but reduce the running costs; within the 
modelling, this is only in terms of reduced fuel costs, but there is some evidence that EVs 
have lower maintenance costs, due to the simpliﬁed nature of the powertrain compared to an 
internal combustion engine. As such, many of these technologies reduce the total cost of 
ownership (TCO) of vehicles. In addition, as technologies are more widely deployed, the cost 
of these technologies comes down, meaning that some technologies which may initially 
cause the TCO to increase can subsequently have the opposite effect, while technologies 
which start out reducing TCO will do so to an increasing extent as deployment rates increase. 
This decrease in TCO means that households need to devote less expenditure to motor vehi-
cles and fuel, and can re-allocate the saved expenditure to other categories (including a 
rebound effect of more use of vehicles).
As a result, the primary impacts on consumer expenditure are a decrease in expenditure on 
motor vehicles and manufactured fuels, replaced by increased expenditure on electricity (for 
recharging of PHEVs/BEVs) and a smaller increase in expenditure across all other catego-
ries. The net increase in consumer expenditure in the scenarios comes primarily from the 
multiplier effects, chieﬂy the downstream effects of the additional investment impacts out-
lined below. As the scale of the changes in consumer expenditure (both in terms of reallocation 
and net increase) increase with more rapid deployment of technology and advanced power-
trains (as these lead to larger shifts in fuel consumption, more purchases of vehicles with a 
lower TCO and require more infrastructure to support the larger ﬂeet), the ELEC scenario 
shows the largest shifts in consumer expenditure in 2030, followed by FCV and BIO.
4.4 Investment
The deployment of PHEVs, BEVs and FCEVs all require the deployment of new infrastruc-
ture to allow the recharging/refuelling of these advanced powertrain vehicles. The VSM 
Table 3: Consumer expenditure at market prices. Relative difference compared to baseline.
Scenario 2030 2050
BIO 0.1% 0.4%
ELEC 1.0% 1.0%
FCV 1.0% 1.2%
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includes assumptions on the density of chargers required (including a distinction between, in 
the case of electric battery recharging, home, work and service station fast-recharging 
requirements) and the costs associated with the manufacture and installation of these. This 
requires additional investment (from either the public or private sector), which creates a 
short-term positive economic impact – however, given the rolling nature of the deployment 
of the infrastructure, this short-term impact perpetuates over the period to 2030.
The scale of infrastructure required, and therefore the amount of investment required, is 
largest in scenarios where advanced powertrains represent the largest share of the vehicle 
stock. Investment over time, therefore, is driven by the time path of advanced powertrain 
penetration in the scenarios; earlier deployment in ELEC requires a developed charging 
infrastructure by 2030, and by 2050, additional investment is largely replacing existing 
charging infrastructure which has reached the end of its serviceable life. In the FCV scenario, 
there is some front-loading of infrastructure investment, but more investment is post-2030. 
As such, the investment impacts in 2030 are larger in the ELEC scenario, while by 2050 FCV 
shows a larger increase above the baseline.
Investment is signiﬁcantly smaller in the BIO scenario, where there is relatively low pene-
tration of PHEVs and BEVs compared to the ELEC and FCV scenarios; relative to the 
baseline, only 0.1% of additional investment is required in 2050.
In addition, all scenarios have small increases in investment due to the wider positive eco-
nomic impacts; the increase in GDP (concentrated across the consumer services sectors) lead 
to small increases in investment from these sectors, reﬂecting the additional capital required 
to deliver the higher levels of output.
4.5 Imports
A shift to low-carbon fuels (biofuels, electricity and hydrogen created via electrolysis) will 
be a shift from fossil fuels, which are imported from overseas to fuels and electricity that are 
domestically produced. This has positive economic impacts, as expenditure which was previ-
ously being leaked overseas (to pay for imports) is, in the scenarios, being spent domestically, 
creating economic activity and jobs in the relevant fuel supply sectors and, through multiplier 
effects, activity in the supply chains to these sectors and the wider economy. However, as a 
counterpoint to this, vehicles with advanced powertrains require more expensive compo-
nents, and the majority of these components are imported into Sweden. As such, there is an 
increase in the value of imports of motor vehicles and electrical equipment associated with 
the deployment of advanced powertrains. As such, although imports of manufactured fuels 
decrease, total imports see a net increase.
The shift in imports of fuels is driven by total demand for fossil fuels, which is a function 
of the deployment of fuel efﬁcient technology and advanced powertrains. The largest decrease 
in manufactured fuel imports in 2030 is seen in the ELEC scenario, where substantial 
Table 4: Investment. Relative difference compared to baseline.
Scenario 2030 2050
BIO 0.0% 0.1%
ELEC 1.3% 0.6%
FCV 1.1% 0.8%
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decreases in demand from passenger cars and vans results in import of manufactured fuels 
being 4.9% lower in 2030 (although total imports are 1.0% higher). In the FCV scenario, 
where the deployment of advanced powertrains takes place later (although it is then more 
wide ranging, including HGVs), imports of fuel fall by 4.8% in 2030 and 6.3% in 2050. 
Finally, in the BIO scenario, there is still a decrease in fossil fuel imports, due to the deploy-
ment of fuel efﬁcient technology, but it is lower than in the other scenarios, at only 0.5% in 
2030 (while total imports increase by 0.2%).
Across most other products, imports increase in all scenarios; this result is driven by both 
the increased cost of components of advanced powertrain vehicles and the increased domes-
tic economic activity, which increases demand for imports either as inputs to production or 
for ﬁnal products for consumers. The largest increase in both 2030 and 2050 is seen in the 
FCV scenario, followed by the ELEC and BIO scenarios. This reﬂects the increased costs of 
FCV vehicles and components in the period to 2030, while by 2050, despite falling technol-
ogy costs, the larger increase in economic activity results in a larger increase in imports than 
in the ELEC scenario.
4.6 Sensitivities
During this modelling, a number of key assumptions have been made, and there is an element 
of uncertainty around each. As such, we have also tested the responsiveness of the results to 
variants of these key assumptions, in order to establish the extent to which our results (and 
speciﬁcally our conclusions) still hold under different possible futures.
From the analysis of the scenarios, the main economic impact of decarbonisation of trans-
port in Sweden comes from the reduction in oil imports and the lowering fuel costs for 
motorists. This impact depends upon the relative prices of fuel over the period to 2030. In our 
baseline, the oil price projections used for this analysis are taken from IEA’s November 2016 
World Energy Outlook, and the cost of petrol and diesel production is assumed to grow in line 
with these oil prices over the period to 2050. However, in a world where transport is decar-
bonised not just in Sweden, but across other major oil consuming countries as well, the shift 
in demand could be large enough to cause a reduction in global oil prices. To assess the 
impact of this, we consider a world where oil prices fell by 30% over the period to 2030.
Table 5: Imports. Relative difference compared to baseline.
Scenario 2030 2050
BIO 0.2% 0.7%
ELEC 1.0% 1.1%
FCV 1.4% 1.1%
Table 6: Imports of manufactured fuels. Relative difference compared to baseline.
Scenario 2030 2050
BIO –0.5% –1.6%
ELEC –4.9% –5.9%
FCV –4.8% –6.3%
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In this sensitivity, although low oil prices reduced the relative beneﬁts of the low-carbon 
transition in terms of GDP in the ELEC scenario in 2030 from 0.42% to 0.36%, importantly 
the impacts were still positive. This is primarily because the efﬁciency savings of many tech-
nologies still lead to a net reduction in the total cost of owning a car, while the economic 
stimulus brought about by the investment in charging infrastructure is unaffected by the 
lower oil price. It should be noted that, because the deployment rates of technologies and 
powertrains is exogenous within the modelling, there is no change in take-up of these, which 
might reasonably be expected in a case where oil prices were lower (and therefore, the rela-
tive attractiveness of these technologies and powertrains was altered).
We also considered a high oil price sensitivity, which might occur if there is a disruption to 
global oil supplies. To model this, we modelled oil prices that increase to be 30% higher than 
the central case by 2030. We ﬁnd the relative beneﬁts of decarbonising transport increase, due 
to a greater decrease in value of oil imports from decarbonisation. Furthermore, consumers 
see a larger fall in total cost of ownership from taking up new technologies and advanced 
powertrains, allowing the re-allocation of more consumer expenditure.
Given the switch towards the use of electricity as a fuel (or the use of electricity in gener-
ating hydrogen for use in fuel cells), the results are also heavily dependent upon the electricity 
price. Again, there is substantial uncertainty as to how electricity prices might develop out to 
2030. If there is even more extensive decarbonisation of the power generation, prices could 
rise to pay for the deployment of additional electricity capacity (as electricity has to be gen-
erated from less optimal sites). Alternatively, technology improvements to grid storage may 
allow the share of renewables in the electricity mix to increase, leading to a fall in the mar-
ginal cost of electricity, which could have the effect of reducing prices considerably. To 
explore these sensitivities, we modelled a change in electricity prices of ±30% by 2050.
With higher electricity prices, there is a marginal reduction in the relative beneﬁts of decar-
bonising transport. This is caused by a slight relative increase in the cost of ownership for 
motorists driving electric and fuel cell vehicles. With lower electricity, the relative reduction 
in cost of ownership leads to a modest change in consumption. Overall, however, the analysis 
is much less sensitive to changes in electricity prices as compared to changes in the oil price 
(there is a spread of less than 0.1% GDP for electricity prices and 0.6% for oil prices). The 
oil price effect is larger as the higher expenditure on oil in the scenarios is all exported (to the 
oil producing countries), whereas in the case of electricity, a higher price reﬂects higher rev-
enues accrued elsewhere in the Swedish economy (for example by domestic construction 
ﬁrms installing the additional generation capacity) and therefore much of the value added is 
retained and recycled in the domestic economy through the multiplier effect.
4.7 Discussion
One of the major ﬁndings of the analysis is the role that biofuels must play in facilitating 
substantial reductions in emissions from the road transport system by 2030. Fuel efﬁcient 
technologies and advanced powertrains will serve to reduce the emissions from new vehicles 
incrementally as there are deployed, but these take time to permeate through the stock, as 
existing (more emissions-intensive) vehicles persist. Even aspirational deployments of tech-
nology and advanced powertrains will not reduce emissions sufﬁcient to realise an 80% 
reduction in emissions in 2030 (as compared to 2010 levels), meaning that biofuels must play 
a role in meeting this. The advantage of the deployment of drop-in biofuels is that these 
impact upon the emissions of the entire vehicle stock, not just new vehicles.
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However, it is clear from this analysis that the deployment of drop-in biofuels is not a pan-
acea to deliver Sweden’s desired reductions in emissions. The potential volume of biomass 
that could be sustainably delivered in Sweden is around 12TWh in the short-term, rising to 
18TWh in the long-term; and in our analysis, none of the technology deployments limited 
demand for biofuel in 2030 to less than the 12TWh capacity, with the additional requirements 
met through the import of biofuels in all cases. The discussion of the availability of biomass 
on a regional and global level, competition with food production, eco-resilience, etc. is out-
side the scope of this paper, but the assumptions we have made regarding availability are 
based on relatively conservative estimates that are valid for Sweden and primarily based on 
Swedish forestry and its residuals [11]. There is a limit to domestic biofuel production capac-
ity, and our analysis suggests that, if Sweden is to meet this ambitious emissions reduction 
target, policy to support both the deployment of new technology and advanced powertrains 
and the drop-in biofuels is required.
It should be noted that there are some limitations to the analysis. The modelling framework 
does not include endogenous estimation of energy prices; as a result, prices of oil and/or 
electricity do not respond to changes in demand as might be expected. For example, the FCV 
scenario would require substantial amounts of electricity generation and, if this is based upon 
intermittent generation (e.g. wind, solar PV), very large amounts of capacity.
The levelized costs associated with this capacity are likely to be higher than the existing 
supply (as they are from higher up the cost-supply curve), and as such could be expected to 
increase average electricity prices. The impact of different oil and electricity prices is explored 
through sensitivities, but these are not varied between scenarios (in the sensitivity analysis a 
high electricity price in the BIO scenario is compared to high electricity prices in the CPI 
scenario, when it might be expected that the high electricity prices would only arise in the 
BIO scenario).
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this study we set out to close the knowledge gap regarding the macroeconomic conse-
quences for Sweden to meet its 2030 CO2 emissions target for road transport. We have 
achieved that by exploring potential pathways to meeting this target and compared them 
against each other and against a baseline scenario where only the currently known EU poli-
cies are met.
Sweden’s CO2 emission target for road transport in 2030 can boost the Swedish economy, 
primarily as a result of the replacement of imported fossil fuels by domestically generated 
electricity and biofuels.
The 2030 target is only possible to reach through fossil CO2 emission reduction solutions 
that can work also on the stock of vehicles already on the market, because the addition of fuel 
efﬁciency technologies, and deployments of advanced powertrains, affects only new vehicle 
sales, and therefore over the limited time period between now and 2030 cannot have a sufﬁ-
ciently large impact on stock emissions. This therefore requires production of biofuels that 
are ‘compatible’ with existing petrol and diesel internal combustion engines, so called drop-in 
biofuels.
To reach the 2030 target, it is necessary to simultaneously implement new technologies, 
which improve the emissions intensity for internal combustion engines, as well as deploying 
advanced powertrains. A further reduction of fossil fuel demand through fuel cell technology 
and domestically produced hydrogen as fuel provides additional beneﬁts in the long run (by 
2050). The very ambitious 2030 target will also require imports of biofuels in the short term.
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This analysis shows that there is no time for hesitation if this emissions target is to be reached. 
An ambitious policy on drop-in fuels is needed, which requires an equally ambitious build-up 
of domestic biofuel production - or the full economic gains for Sweden will not materialise.
The need for a rapid increase of the share of electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles in new 
vehicle sale will require strong and long-lasting policy instruments, for instance ﬁscal incentives 
for the purchase of advanced powertrains, to compensate for the early-stage differences in cost 
and attractiveness among offered technologies. Such policies can drive a quick shift towards 
electriﬁcation, at the same time as technology reduces the fuel use of the remaining ICEs that are 
sold and drop-in fuels reduce the emissions associated with ICE fuel consumption.
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